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B O O K R E V I E WS

Sarantakes and Taylor: George C. Marshall and the Early Cold War: Policy, Politics, and

despite an inauspicious beginning and
the subsequent controversial execution
of Admiral John Byng (and the end
of Anson’s initial term as First Lord),
the Royal Navy had reinvented itself
successfully under fire, becoming the
dominant naval force in Europe by the
end of the Seven Years’ War (1763).
Lord Anson did not take office with
specific reforms in mind; instead he
repeatedly responded to demonstrated
deficiencies in the Royal Navy. On the
other hand, he left for the attentions
of future First Lords such as Sandwich
and St. Vincent the reform of the
royal dockyards. With the establishment of the Impress Service, Anson’s
administration made the practice of
impressment more efficient, though not
more palatable to British mariners.
Lavery’s work compellingly illustrates
how the Royal Navy under Anson’s
leadership took the first critical steps
needed to face a resurgent France at
the turn of the nineteenth century
and to ensure that Britannia would
continue to rule the waves.
MICHAEL ROMERO

George C. Marshall and the Early Cold War:
Policy, Politics, and Society, ed. William A. Taylor. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 2020. 310
pages. $29.95.

Almost everyone reading this journal
knows that George C. Marshall is
one of the most important figures in
the history of the national security
of the United States. His role as U.S.
Army Chief of Staff dominates the
historical literature, but his achievements as Secretary of State and
Secretary of Defense also were huge.
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It was to study these later achievements
that William A. Taylor assembled this
anthology, which focuses on Marshall’s
record during the early portion of the
Cold War. Since a variety of authors
are involved in these types of projects,
there is always a range in the quality
of the contributions. The authors of
the various chapters are a diverse mix,
ranging from junior assistant professors
to emeriti, but the bulk seem to be at
the junior associate level. It is a credit
to Taylor’s editorial and administrative
skills that the variance in the quality
of the offerings is rather small.
The topics the authors explore include
universal military training, the effort to
mediate the Chinese civil war, the creation of an independent U.S. Air Force,
the National Security Act of 1947, the
role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy,
the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the Korean War,
and the racial integration of the armed
forces. While Marshall was a major
player in affairs of state for the whole
period between 1939 and 1951, his presence throughout was less than total; for
instance, despite the authors’ assertions
in the chapters on the National Security
Act of 1947 and the desegregation of the
military, he barely played a role in those
evolutions. Some of the material is hardly
new; the chapters on the Marshall Plan
and nuclear weapons are short versions
of the authors’ books on the same topics.
Like all editors of books of this type,
Taylor ties all the essays together in an
introduction and a conclusion. These
sections in anthologies often are not
that useful, but Taylor makes some
solid points in his conclusion about
the importance of tying defense and
foreign policies to social values, and also
regarding the importance of alliances
and how to make them stronger.
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However, several other themes emerge
in two or more chapters that get no
mention in Taylor’s bookend sections.
• Marshall won more than he lost, but
he did lose often, when he did not
have the stronger argument. Universal
military training and military unification are two perfect examples.
• A significant element in Marshall’s
approach to strategy was his effort to
find initiatives that were economically
sustainable. He knew there were limits
to power, even U.S. financial power,
and he wanted to find mechanisms
that could be sustained over the long
term.
• The logic of military power is the logic
of military power. Marshall did not
turn a blind eye to new technology—he
saw the great potential and value in airpower, for instance—but new weapon
systems, even nuclear weapons, were
just tools; they did not invalidate strategic plans and concepts. Put another
away, the more things changed, the
more Marshall stayed the same.
• Marshall was not beholden to the
institutional interests of the U.S. Army.
Even though he had spent most of his
adult life wearing brown and khaki
uniforms, he often prioritized the
contributions of the air and sea services
over those of the Army. He never let
bureaucratic concerns direct nationalsecurity policy or strategy.
• Marshall always took a core-andperiphery approach to geopolitics and
strategy. Europe was the main theater
in both World War II and the Cold
War. Even though he had spent part of
his career in China as an early version
of a foreign area officer, going so far as
to learn Chinese, he never developed
a case of “professional localism” in
policy toward China. The United States
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needed to limit its involvement in East
Asia, and during the Korean War he
worked hard to keep the conflict from
spreading to other regions—to avert it
from becoming the Cold War version
of the assassination of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand.
Individuals looking for strategic guidance
from the career of George C. Marshall,
or on any of the topics addressed in this
book, will find the time they invest in
these pages a worthwhile endeavor.
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

One Belt One Road: Chinese Power Meets the
World, by Eyck Freymann. Harvard East Asian
Monograph 439. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.
Asia Center, 2021. 330 pages. $28 (paperback).

This is an ambitious book about
China’s geostrategic initiative known
as One Belt, One Road (OBOR).
The main benefit to be gained from
reading Freymann’s well-researched
volume is the macro understanding
gained about the massive, continentspanning efforts under way by the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). By
adopting a macro assessment built
on microlevel case studies of select
OBOR investments in ports located
across the globe, the author succeeds
in providing both a big-picture
understanding and a detailed depiction of what OBOR represents to
China and potentially to the world.
Because documenting China’s OBOR is
an overwhelming task, few have tried
to capture the program in its entirety.
In attempting to do so, Freymann’s
monograph provides a public service.
Rather than just reviewing newspaper
headlines and press releases, the author
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